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A.   BACKGROUND 
Faced with new government-wide mandates for cost reduction, budget cuts, and 
increased public scrutiny, the Navy must find more proficient and effective methods to 
procure goods and services. One way to achieve this is through strategic sourcing, 
defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (OMB, 2005, p. 1) as "A 
collaborative and structured process of analyzing an organization's spending and using 
the information to make business decisions about acquiring commodities and services 
more efficiently and effectively." A steadily increasing reliance on contracted services at 
military installations is further justification for more efficient and effective source 
selection methods. 
B.   PURPOSE 
Recent research conducted by Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón (2009) at the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School has proven that using a pricing optimization model to Base 
Operations Support Services (BOSS) contracts on U.S. Air Force installations results in 
both significant cost savings and optimization of contracting resources. Within this 
document, the term “BOSS” refers to support services, which include lawn maintenance, 
refuse removal, and janitorial services.  This project attempts to prove that similar 
improvements can be made by applying the same model to installation service contracts 
for use by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).   
C.   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Our research objectives, identified below, were developed to identify the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the strategic sourcing methods currently used by 
NAVFAC for BOSS contracts. Our research objectives: 
1. Primary Research Objective 
Identify whether the NAVFAC is currently using strategic sourcing practices for 
BOSS contracts. 
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2. Subsidiary Research Objectives 
(1) Analyze current data to determine if these strategic sourcing methods are both 
efficient and effective, 
(2) Attempt to improve the current methods, if any, by applying actual data to a 
proven decision model, and 
(3)  Provide recommendations to senior Navy acquisition leaders. 
D.   EXPECTED BENEFITS 
Currently, the Navy is contracting for basic operating and support services on 
naval installations. We have examined the Navy's ability to use strategic sourcing in these 
contracts by collecting and analyzing data that is available through NAVFAC contracting 
activities. By applying this information to a known pricing optimization model, we can 
determine if the Navy could benefit from using this model and what policies could be 
implemented to help them become even more efficient and effective. Based on our 
findings, we provide recommendations that could potentially improve the source 
selection strategy of the NAVFAC. 
E.  SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
Within the contents of this study, we only examine current BOSS contracts 
provided through NAVFAC.  We do not compare contracts earlier than 2009, and we 
caution the reader that the techniques we used in this study may not be applicable to other 
contract types.  We apply a known model that was developed for Air Force BOSS 
contracts to NAVFAC BOSS contracts in order to determine whether similar 
improvements similar to those identified in the Air Force study can be made by applying 
proper strategic sourcing methods in an attempt to achieve significant cost savings. 
To achieve the thesis objectives, we organize our research into six chapters.  In 
the Chapter I, we present our research objectives and an overall roadmap of the follow-on 
chapters.  In Chapter II, we conduct a literature review in which the development of 
strategic sourcing is discussed, as well as how it applies to the acquisition of services in 
the Department of Defense, specifically to the Navy.  Chapter III describes NAVFAC 
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and its overall strategy and contracting environment.  The research provided by 
Professors Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón was pivotal to the thesis. Chapter IV, Service-
Based Strategic Sourcing Model, describes the model they developed and how it applies 
to service-based strategic sourcing.  This chapter also details the process in which we 
organized the data provided by NAVFAC in such a way that it could be easily entered to 
the pricing optimization model.  In Chapter V, Results and Analysis, a comparison of the 
pricing optimization model results to both the lowest cost and best Confidence in 
Performance Level (CPL) selection processes is conducted.  Finally, in Chapter VI, we 
provide a summary of our research, conclusions and recommendations based on our 
results, and suggested areas of further research. 
F.   METHODOLOGY 
 The results of the optimization model are dependent on obtaining usable and 
accurate data.  Initially, we understood that each Service handled services acquisition 
differently.  Through the extensive research that we performed to map out the history of 
service-based strategic sourcing, we found that NAVFAC was the organization 
responsible for administering BOSS contracts in the Navy.    Through NAVFAC, we 
were able to obtain data for use with the PO model. 
For our evaluation of the NAVFAC data using the pricing optimization model, we 
utilized the same underlying assumptions that were made by Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón 
(2009) in their problem.  We made these assumptions simply to ease the development of 
our scenarios.  In addition, we continued to use five installations as the maximum number 
of installations on which a single offeror can submit a proposal.  The remaining 
assumptions are as follows:  (1) each offeror submits proposals on numerous 
solicitations, but the maximum number of installations in a solicitation is fixed; (2) all 
offerors offer the same percentage of quantity discounts that are based on the number of 
installations included in the proposal; and (3) all installations have the same preference in 
CPL of the offerors.  For consistency, we utilized the same notation as the Apte, Rendon, 
and Salmerón model.  Unlike the data provided to Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón by the 
U.S. Air Force, NAVFAC did not provide data that contained combined proposals by any 
offeror.   
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G.   SUMMARY 
 In the first chapter, we presented our research objectives and described the 
contents of the subsequent chapters.  This chapter identified the background, purpose, 
and objectives of our research.  In addition, we described the expected benefits of our 
research.  We provided a detailed description of the scope and organization of the 
research as well as the methodology used to conduct the study.  In the next chapter, we 
conduct a literature review in which the development of strategic sourcing is discussed, 
as well as how it applies to the acquisition of services in the Department of Defense, 






















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a literature review of the development of 
strategic sourcing.  In addition, we describe how strategic sourcing applies to the 
acquisition of services in the Department of Defense and specifically to the Navy.   
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines strategic sourcing as “the 
collaborative and structured process of critically analyzing an organization’s spending 
and using this information to make business decisions about acquiring commodities and 
services more effectively and efficiently.”  Additionally it helps government agencies to 
optimize performance, minimize price, increase achievement of socio-economic 
acquisition goals, evaluate total life cycle management costs, improve vendor access to 
business opportunities, and otherwise increase the value of each dollar spent (OMB, 
2005).  Although both strategic sourcing and operational sourcing require buyers to 
develop relationships with suppliers, strategic sourcing is differentiated from standard 
operational sourcing by managing relationships with critical suppliers, developing 
electronic purchasing systems, implementing companywide best practices, negotiating 
companywide supply contracts, and managing critical commodities (Monczka et al., 
2009). 
When discussing the subject of strategic sourcing, the conversation must begin 
with the roots of its implementation.  Our current methodology of strategic sourcing is a 
borrowed idea that originated with the Japanese.  Like many ideas that other countries 
have initialized, from military strategy to shipbuilding, the United States has adopted 
them and made limitless attempts to make them even better.  With federal strategic 
sourcing, however, the Department of Defense has arguably taken too long to climb 
onboard this cost-saving initiative.  In the following section of this paper, we discuss how 
and why strategic sourcing was implemented, who developed it, what private industries 
in the United States were the first to adopt this procurement strategy, and whether they 
were successful in doing so. 
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Since 1955, the federal government had been issuing policies to promote 
competition between the public and private sectors for the performance of services.  
These early policies encouraged federal agencies to compete commercially when they 
found such an action to be cost effective.  Additionally, as administrations and budgets 
have changed, Congress has passed legislation to increase reporting requirements and to 
regulate spending for the acquisition of necessary goods and services. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) faces several challenges in its attempt to 
implement strategic sourcing initiatives.  Some of these challenges can be resolved by 
looking to industry’s innovative solutions to similar challenges.  Others are said to be 
specific to the DoD.  Some of these challenges include socio-economic concerns and the 
DoD’s inability to access valuable spending information, which we discuss later.  
Despite those challenges, the DoD has had some success at the agency level in 
strategic sourcing for both goods and services.  These successes may serve as positive 
examples in the implementation of a DoD-wide strategic sourcing policy. 
B.   DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC SOURCING 
Until nearly 1950, Japan did not find a need for what is known today as strategic 
sourcing.  Their businesses, up until this time, were largely single-unit production 
companies.  These businesses did not find a need to outsource to contractors because of 
the country’s technological state.  With no mass telecommunications systems, 
transportation systems, or large-scale production lines in place, major corporations in 
Japan did not yet realize what was to come (Nishiguchi, 1994). 
By 1960, Japan’s long road to recovery from the devastating effects of World War 
II had finally come to an end.  With Japan’s economy on the rise, there was much more 
diversification between small and large firms.  This size range of businesses, coupled 
with the fact that the country’s economy was on a rebound, created an increasingly 
complex variety of goods and services produced and delivered.  Increased competition 
between similar producers of goods and services was the welcomed side effect of this 
development.  Without fail, Japanese businesses small and large rose to the occasion.  
Companies realized that they had to find a way to reduce costs while simultaneously 
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delivering a quality product or service.  Achievement of this objective required a 
complete overhaul of procurement business practices for companies within all industries 
(Nishiguchi, 1994). 
Prior to this, contractors for large businesses in Japan served merely as distrusted 
associates that would produce or fabricate only individual pieces of a part or product.  
However, this was exactly the element that Japanese companies would transform.  With 
the threat of other competition, executives decided to develop a new, enriched 
relationship with their contractors.  This relationship would be one of trust and 
dependence on each other (Nishiguchi, 1994). 
Before this shift in corporate strategy, contractors were responsible only for 
subassemblies of a product in which the design and specifications were provided.  Today 
these same contractors would be charged with the responsibility of manufacturing a 
complete product, with the opportunity to propose designs and specifications to the buyer 
in an effort to induce what is known as Value Engineering (VE).  VE is defined by The 
Purchasing Machine (Nelson, Moody & Stegner, 2001) as the careful analysis of design 
early in the new product cycle, to determine best materials, best tooling, and best 
manufacturing processes.  This change in strategy was a win-win situation for both 
parties involved with the product or service.  By outsourcing to contractors in this 
manner, the company was able to focus on more research and development projects to 
stay ahead of its competition and reap reduced production costs by purchasing in volume.  
By willingly accepting the proposal of a closer business relationship that involved 
production of a product from start to finish, the contractor was able to enjoy increased 
revenues as well as a widened skill set and knowledge of the niche (Nishiguchi, 1994). 
This responsibility was not offered as an open-ended relationship to contractors.  
A company’s ability to decide whether to make or buy, or to select a specific contractor, 
was critical to the success of the business transformation.  In fact, these Japanese 
companies based their contracting decision of whom to award to on several factors.  As 
stated by Nishiguchi (1994), in order to ensure the continuous output of low-cost and 
high-quality products, new practices were designed.  These new practices were based on  
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commitments to problem solving by both companies and contractors.  Some examples 
include Value Analysis (VA), VE, the cost planning method of product development, and 
profit sharing rules, to name a few. 
It is important to include what Nishiguchi (1994) believed to be the most 
important result of this Japanese procurement development, which was simply a change 
in the fundamental approach to developing contractual affiliations.  He believed that 
synergistic effects of bilateral problem solving would be achieved by allowing both the 
company and contractor to benefit from the business transactions under newly established 
rules. 
C. ADOPTION BY U.S. BUSINESSES 
 There is no doubt that the strategic sourcing strategies of the Japanese in the 
1960s were effective.  In fact, their effectiveness at achieving their objective of cost 
reductions and improved efficiencies was noticed across the globe.  Major corporations in 
the United States adopted strategic sourcing as early as the mid 1960s.  In the automotive 
industry, major changes were made by the procurement executive at Chrysler in order to 
realize exponential cost reductions and, thus, healthier bottom lines and returns for 
shareholders.  This change, however, did not happen immediately (Rudzki, Smock, 
Katzorke & Stewart, 2006). 
For decades, the automotive industry, along with the majority of other American-
owned businesses, strong-armed their suppliers.  They threatened their suppliers into 
reducing prices or facing elimination from future procurement.  While this may have 
worked in the short term, long-term profits were not realized by doing so.  A shift in 
procurement strategy was needed, and Thomas Stallkamp, Chrysler’s procurement 
executive in the early 1990s, had the answers (Rudzki et al., 2006). 
Faced with detrimental losses at the close of the 1980s, Chrysler’s procurement 
team had become an integral part of the executive team’s struggle with achieving profits.  
Knowing that nearly 70% of the total vehicle cost resulted from purchased components, 




suppliers.  Under Stallkamp’s leadership, Chrysler created a program called Supplier 
Cost Reduction Effort (SCORE), which targeted 150 of the company’s principal suppliers 
(Rudzki et al., 2006). 
From design to build, SCORE encouraged contractors to think outside of the box 
when it came to producing a product.  Chrysler offered half of the return on any proven 
savings to  their suppliers from the onset of this plan.  All suppliers quickly realized that 
this program was not only helping them keep a business relationship with their customer, 
but also it was positively affecting their profit margins each reporting period.  By 
incorporating this sort of VE approach into the SCORE program, Chyrsler realized 
tremendous savings that could not have been achieved without it.  In fact, one of its 
suppliers proposed a way to save $4 per unit “by switching from cast metal to injection 
molded nylon intake manifolds” (Rudzki et al., 2006).  Like the Japanese, Chrysler 
incorporated into this program a way to properly grade supplier performance through a 
specific set of metrics that integrated the amount of money saved with how much of the 
savings they kept.   
D. REALIZATION BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
 In the mid 1980s, Ronald Reagan, then President of the United States, had 
received numerous reports of inefficient procurement practices within the Department of 
Defense that were using taxpayer dollars.  He immediately ordered the formation of the 
Blue Ribbon Commission to not only investigate these specific allegations but also to 
propose new ways of doing business that would ultimately save taxpayer dollars and 
improve performance.  The commission’s chairman, David Packard, who is also the 
author of the final report on the board’s findings, said the following: 
Chances for meaningful improvement will come not from more regulation 
but only with major institutional change.  During the last decade or so a 
new theory of management has evolved.  It has been developed by a 
limited number of U.S. companies, and it has flourished in Japan.  These 
practices have resulted in much higher productivity and much higher 
quality in the products being produced.  They involve participation of all 
of the people in the organization in deciding among themselves how the 




In the end, the Blue Ribbon Commission made seven specific recommendations to the 
President for improvement of the Department of Defense acquisition system: streamline 
the acquisition organization and procedures, use technology to reduce costs, balance cost 
and performance, stabilize programs, expand the use of commercial products, increase 
the use of competition, and enhance the quality of the acquisition personnel (Rudzki et 
al., 2006).  
 David Packard believed that, by instituting these changes, it would be possibile to 
reduce the acquisition life cycle by half.  This achievement would not come easily, 
however, and, in fact, would require a significant amount of support from each branch of 
the U.S. federal government, especially the executive and legislative branches.  Packard  
believed that the implementation of practices similar to those proven to be successful in 
the corporate sector would ulitimately save the taxpayers an enormous amount of money 
each year. 
E. INITIATION OF STRATEGIC SOURCING WITHIN U.S. 
GOVERNMENT 
OMB Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, established Federal 
policy regarding the performance of commercial activities with the intent that “the 
government should not compete with its citizens” and that the government was “to rely 
on commercial sources to supply the products and services the government needs” 
(OMB, 1983).  This national policy originated in the Bureau of the Budget Bulletins in 
the late 1950s and was restated in OMB Circular A-76, published in 1966 (OMB, 1983).  
Circular A-76 has continued to be updated through changing administrations (OMB, 
2003).  In 1979, Circular A-76 was supplemented with a handbook of procedures for 
conducting cost comparison studies (OMB, 1996). 
In August 1995, the DoD “made the [A-76] process a priority so as to reduce 
operating costs and free funds for other priorities” (GAO, 2002, March). That same year, 
the effort was subsequently incorporated as a major initiative under the  Secretary of 
Defense’s Reform Initiative and referred to as “competitive sourcing” (GAO, 2002, 
March).  In the Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 
and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed 
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Services, part of the House’s Military Readiness Subcommittee hearings, the Honorable 
Joel Hefley, a Representative from Colorado, briefed that the DoD claimed that no matter 
who won the competitions between public and private sectors using A-76, there would be 
substantial savings. He continued by saying that the “DoD was so confident of the 
savings that $11.3 billion was removed from the fiscal years 1999 to 2004 defense 
agencies and military services operation and maintenance accounts and placed into the 
modernization accounts” (House of Representatives, 2002). 
 However, without a detailed listing of what services were available to be 
outsourced, the OMB had no visibility of the need of the various federal agencies.  On 
October 12, 1998, Public Law 105-270, the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) 
Act of 1998, was passed with the intention “to provide a process for identifying the 
functions of the federal government that are not inherently governmental functions, and 
for other purposes” (U.S. Congress, 1998, p. 2).  It required that the head of each 
executive agency (e.g., the Department of Defense) annually submit to the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget a detailed list of activities that were not inherently 
government functions that had been performed for that agency by federal government 
sources.  The OMB would review the list and consult with the head of each agency.  
Once the review was complete, the OMB would provied the list to Congress, and it 
would be made available to the public. When the executive agency considered 
contracting with a private-sector source for the function on the list, it was recommended 
by the OMB to use a competitive process to select the source and ensure that all costs 
were realistic and fair.  The FAIR Act was subsequently included in the 1999 edition of 
OMB Circular A-76 (U.S. Congress, 1998). 
In 1995, the DoD (specifically, the Navy) “made the [strategic sourcing] process a 
priority so as to reduce operating costs and free funds for other priorities” (GAO, 2000).  
Although the Navy’s effort focused on research, development, and testing (RD&T), it 
was important across the spectrum because it was the DoD’s first look at strategic 
sourcing.  In 1995, motivated by the Navy's policy needs in connection with the 1995 
round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and its longer-term need to make the 
best use of its resources, a study was performed by RAND’s National Defense Research 
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Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. The study’s 
recommendation had three parts: focus on developing funding priorities, discuss 
alternative procurement arrangements that were seeing increasing use in the private 
sector and that had been used in various parts of the government, and combine the first 
two parts. In addition, it suggested a way to help determine which parts of the Naval 
RD&T infrastructure were best suited for alternative procurement arrangements and a 
possible way to determine which facilities might be involved (Saunders et al., 1995). 
But as of 2000, the Navy was the only Service with a definite plan to use the 
strategic sourcing program to achieve the goals of the A-76 program.  The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) visited Naval Sea Systems Command’s 
weapons station at Crane, Indiana, where they had begun a strategic sourcing program in 
fiscal year 1998.  This program served as the strategic sourcing pilot for the Naval Sea 
Systems Command and anticipated a savings of $158 million by fiscal year 2005.  At the 
time of the GAO report on competitive sourcing, both the Army and Air Force “had 
stated their intentions to consider the use of strategic sourcing to obtain the savings goals 
established for A-76 efforts” (GAO, 2000).  However, Marine Corps officials stated that 
they had not made any commitments to a strategic sourcing effort at that time. They 
further explained that within the “latest business plan, the Marine Corps is placing a 
strong emphasis on A-76 as the primary tool for efficiencies in commercial functions” 
(GAO, 2000). 
It was not until 1999 that the “DoD [officially] began to augment its A-76 
program with what it term[ed] strategic sourcing” (GAO, 2001).  The Hon. Joel Hefley 
also stated that “In 1999, the Department recognized that the anticipated savings could 
not be achieved from the A-76 process alone, so the Department turned to something 
called “strategic sourcing” as a means to make up the shortfall” (House of 
Representatives, 2002).  A memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) in April 2000, titled DoD Strategic and Competitive 
Sourcing Programs Interim Guidance, stated that strategic sourcing “provides a broader 
approach than the traditional OMB Circular A-76 process” and “should not be interpreted 
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as avoidance or replacement of A-76” (Secretary of Defense (A&T), 2000).  The DoD 
also stated that the Strategic Sourcing Program was consistent with the reinvention 
process described in the OMB Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook: 
The reinvention of government begins by focusing on core mission 
competencies and service requirements. Thus, the reinvention process 
must consider a wide range of options, including: the consolidation, 
restructuring or reengineering of activities, privatization options, make or 
buy decisions, the adoption of better business management practices, the 
development of joint ventures with the private sector, asset sales, the 
possible devolution of activities to state and local governments and the 
termination of obsolete services or programs. In the context of this larger 
reinvention effort the scope of this Supplemental Handbook is limited to 
the conversion of recurring commercial activities to or from in-house, 
contract or ISSA [Inter-Service Support Agreement] performance. (OMB, 
1996, p. 3) 
 
In addition, the DoD stated that “the key step in the Strategic Sourcing Program is to 
define properly the whole function, activity, or organization in order to optimize or 
improve the level of performance or service at a reduced cost” and that the “process is 
continual […] and can result in various outcomes depending on how functions or 
organizations are defined” (Secretary of Defense (A&T), 2000).  The interim guidance 
also lists the criteria to be met in order to use the Strategic Sourcing Program, including 
management requirements, accounting requirements, cost savings, focus on the A-76 
process, and compliance with statutory regulations.  The flow chart in Figure 1 details the 























Figure 1.   Strategic Sourcing Program Decision Tree 
(Secretary of Defense (A&T), 2000) 
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In June 2001, the Commercial Activities Panel detailed various issues with the A-
76 process that developed in fiscal year 2000.  Government workers’ concern over job 
stability, industry representatives’ complaints about unfairness in the process, and 
governmental concerns about oversight of future performance had led Congress to enact 
section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. The 
legislation required the comptroller general to convene a Commercial Activities Panel to 
study the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial activities for the 
federal government from government to contractor personnel.  The panel found that the 
most serious shortcoming of the A-76 process was that it had “not worked well as the 
basis for competitions that seek to identify the best provider in terms of quality, 
innovation, flexibility, and reliability” (GAO, 2002, June).  Additionally, it stated that 
“while cost is always a factor, and often the most important factor, it is not the only factor 
that may need to be considered” and concluded that the A-76 process “may no longer be 
as effective a tool” (GAO, 2002, June).  In its summary, however, one of the key points 
that the panel raised was that “sourcing decisions require a strategic approach” (GAO, 
2002, June). 
In a 2003 report regarding contract management and the acquisition of services, 
the GAO made the recommendation that the “Secretary of Defense should direct the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) to work 
with the military departments and the defense agencies to further strengthen the 
management structure” (2003, September, p. 18). Subsequently, Congress required this 
structure to be established in response to section 801 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 and stated that it 
should promote the use of best commercial practices such as centralizing 
key functions, conducting spend analyses, expanding the use of cross-
functional commodity teams, achieving strategic orientation, achieving 
savings by reducing purchasing costs and other efficiencies, and 
improving service contracts' performance and outcomes. (GAO, 2003, 
September, p. 18) 
 
In response, the USD (AT&L) launched the DoD-wide Strategic Sourcing 
(DWSS) Program to pilot the use of best commercial practices. The program included 
two pilots: the Spend Analysis Technical Solution and the Spend Analysis Operational 
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Solution.   The Spend Analysis Technical Solution built an information technology 
system that would pull data from disparate databases for analysis by DoD buying teams.  
The Spend Analysis Operational Solution tested the use of cross-functional teams to 
coordinate and manage  support service procurements in the same way as commercial 
best practices identified by the GAO. The spend analysis initially focused on analyzing 
the Administrative Services commodity and was to define how, from an operational 
perspective, a commodity group would be analyzed for identifying strategic sourcing 
opportunities.  In January 2005, after completing the DWSS pilot, the DoD approved a 
concept of operations for the full implementation of the DWSS program, which, 
according to the DoD, “further strengthens the department's management structure for the 
acquisition of services” (GAO, 2003, September 10).  Under the new plan, the DoD 
planned to further strengthen the management structure for acquiring key services and 
products by creating "Strategic Sourcing Coordinating Groups" within each military 
department and within other defense agencies running commodity teams, who are 
responsible for a specific portfolio of commodities (GAO, 2003, September).  However, 
because the DoD lacked the plan to coordinate across agencies in regard to services 
acquisitions, Air Force, Army, and Navy headquarters developed initiatives to better 
manage services acquisitions (U.S. Congress, 2001). 
In October 2002, the Army Contracting Agency was established to centralize 
installation-support contracting.  The agency was also responsible for Army-wide 
purchases of general information technology and electroniccommerce purchases.  The 
agency assigns regional responsibility for managing services acquisitions and also 
includes a council to oversee strategic approaches to installation support services (GAO, 
2003, September). 
Also in 2002, the Navy conducted an independent spend analysis of purchasing 
data and estimated that approximately $115 million could be saved by taking a more 
strategic approach to $1.5 billion in services acquisitions.  Earlier that year, to initiate a 




position for a Director of Program Analysis and Business Transformation within the 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition Management (GAO, 2003, 
September). 
In 2003, the GAO reported that the Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Contracting called for rethinking business processes, noting that the Air Force spent over 
half of its discretionary dollars on services, yet most of the Air Force’s attention went to 
managing goods. In July 2003, in the first such effort to take advantage of its overall 
buying power, the Air Force formed a commodity council that was responsible for 
developing department-wide strategies for buying and managing information technology 
products.  The Air Force also noted that it was considering a future commodity council 
for construction services (GAO, 2003, September). 
Additionally, in April 2003 the Secretary of the Navy issued rough guidance to 
the Navy and Marine Corps, including the Strategic Sourcing Program Guidance.  Those 
principles included divesting of functions that are not critical, retaining the skills 
necessary to support the core competency of the Navy and Marine Corps, establishing a 
system for accounting and tracking these efforts, conducting A-76 studies on a minimum 
of 20%-30% of billets studied, sharing and implementing best business practices, and 
leveraging the market place advantages inherent in a broader grouping of functions 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2003). The flow chart in Figure 2 is currently used by the Navy to 










Figure 2.   Strategic Sourcing Process Chart 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2003) 
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The OMB published a memorandum in May 2005 that was directed to the Chief 
Acquisition Officer (CAO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and Chief Information 
Officers (CIOs) of all federal agencies and that cited the increasing annual cost of goods 
and services; the memorandum identified “not fewer than three commodities that could 
be purchased more effectively and efficiently through the application of strategic 
sourcing” (p. 1).  It also expressed the goal that unlike A-76, which is merely cost based, 
strategic sourcing helps “optimize performance, minimize price, increase achievement of 
socio-economic acquisition goals, evaluate total life cycle management costs, improve 
vendor access to business opportunities, and otherwise increase the value of each dollar 
spent” (p. 1).  These goals fell well outside of the bounds of A-76 and applied more 
closely to the Commercial Activities Panel’s findings (OMB, 2005). 
F. CHALLENGES TO TRANSFORMATION 
The Department of Defense (DoD) faces several challenges in its attempt to 
implement strategic sourcing initiatives.  Some of these challenges can be resolved by 
looking to industry’s innovative solutions to similar challenges.  Others are said to be 
specific to the DoD.  Each of these challenges is discussed below.  
1. Public Policy Concerns 
The DoD’s procurement process is subject to many public laws and statutes, some 
of which pertain to the implementation of certain public policy objectives.  Some of these 
public policies include providing opportunities to small and disadvantaged businesses and 
allowing for maximum competition in order to achieve the best possible value for the 
government (Rendon, 2005).  Advocates of small business are concerned (Searle, 2006) 
about the impact of strategic sourcing on their ability to compete. They argue that a DoD 
transformation to strategic sourcing would hinder competition and the opportunities that 
are currently available to both small and disadvantaged businesses (Rendon, 2005). 
Small businesses are concerned because they make tremendous contributions to 
private industry.   Table 1 highlights statistics provided by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) and illustrates the value of small-business contributions to the U.S.  
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economy.  Clearly, small businesses play an important role in the U.S. economy, which 
poses a significant challenge to transforming the DoD procurement policy to a strategic 
one.   
Table 1.   Statistics from the Small Business Administration 
(SBA, 2009, September) 
Small Business Contributions in the U.S. 
• Employ more than 50% of all private-sector employees 
• Generated 64% of all new jobs in the last 15 years 
• Employ more than 40% of high-tech workers 
• Make up 90% of all exporters in the U.S. 
• Produce 13 times more patents than large firms 
  
Other public offices are not so supportive of the small business approach to 
procurement (Rendon, 2005).  As an example, the state procurement office in 
Pennsylvania strategically sourced office supplies in 2004.  This move reduced the state’s 
supplier base from more than eighteen hundred to just one for all state agencies.  In 
addition, the state reduced its number of state-run warehouses from 14 to 4, resulting in a 
savings of more than $4.5 million (Patton, 2006).  State officials indicated that they 
conducted internal discussions regarding the economic impact of reducing the number of 
suppliers.  However, they decided that their responsibility was to the taxpayer, not to 
subsidizing businesses through procurement (Patton, 2006).  Although this may be an 
extreme example, the state of Pennsylvania may have provided, at a minimum, a wake-up 
call for government in general, reminding us that not only do we have a responsibility to 
the warfighter, but also to the taxpayer. 
 A recent GAO report suggests that this challenge is not specific to the DoD.  
Industry has overcome similar challenges during their own transformation to a more 
strategic approach to procurement (GAO, 2003, June).  By conducting spend analysis, the 
GAO suggested that companies in industry are able to track and generate reports that 
identify spending with small and disadvantaged business (GAO, 2003, June).  Of course, 
this depends upon a company’s ability to collect accurate data so that this type of 
information can be extracted, another challenge that the DoD faces, which is discussed 
later.  Spend analysis has provided these companies with data that has allowed them to 
balance goals for corporate savings with small business utilization goals (GAO, 2004).  
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Although DoD small business concerns are more policies than goals like those in private 
industry, perhaps the DoD can take an approach similar to those adopted by industry that 
would balance savings goals and social responsibilities. 
2. Access to Accurate Spend Data 
 Another challenge preventing the DoD from implementing a change to strategic 
sourcing is its inability to access data required for spend analysis (Rendon, 2005).  This is 
a tremendous roadblock to transformation because a detailed spend analysis is necessary 
in order to identify areas in which money can be saved by implementing a sourcing 
strategy.  There are several reasons for this lack of accessibility.   
 The GAO has reported that the data systems used by the federal government are 
wrought with weaknesses (GAO, 2009).  In particular, the Federal Procurement Data 
System–Next Generation (FPDS–NG)—which was developed to collect and provide 
information regarding actions and trends in government contracts and to track 
socioeconomic goals—contains data that is not accurate, is not entered correctly, or not 
entered at all (Rendon, 2005).  In addition, each agency within the DoD is performing its 
own purchasing to support its own specific needs.  Although in some cases these agencies 
are purchasing the same items, there is little to no coordination among procurement 
offices (Rendon, 2005).   
 Commercial businesses have experienced similar challenges to their own efforts 
to conduct spend analysis.  Many companies have found it difficult to collect spend data 
because different parts of the company were purchasing the same supplies or services but 
were not necessarily sharing purchasing data (GAO, 2004).  In addition, companies 
experienced similar issues with inaccurate, incomplete, or non-existent data.  In other 
words, this is not a challenge that is unique to the DoD.  Although the DoD is a much 
larger organization than many of the companies that have successfully implemented a 
spend analysis program and a strategic sourcing plan, it is still possible to take advantage 
of industry success by tailoring and implementing private-sector practices within the 
DoD.  This is particularly true in the area of efficient procurement (GAO, 2004). 
 Companies that have ultimately adopted strategic purchasing systems overcame 
the data challenge and went on to develop automation information systems that compile 
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and store spend data to support a formal spend analysis program (GAO, 2004).  The 
GAO identified five key processes for spend analysis:  automation, extraction, 
supplemental information, organization, and analysis and strategic goals (GAO, 2004). 
These processes can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.   Key Spend Analysis Processes 
  (GAO, 2004) 
Spend Analysis: Key Processes 
1 Automation: Data automatically compiled. 
2 Extraction: Essential data culled from accounts payable and other internal 
systems. 
3 Supplemental information: Additional data sought from other internal and 
external sources. 
4 Organization: Reviewed data to ensure accuracy and completeness; organized 
data into logical comprehensive commodity and supplier categories. 
5 Analysis and strategic goals: Using standard reporting and analytical tools, data 
analyzed on a continual basis to support decisions on strategic sourcing and 
procurement management in areas such as cost-cutting, streamlining operations, 
and reducing the number of suppliers; scope generally covers an organization’s 
entire spending. 
 
The DoD is aware that accurate data is critical to transforming its procurement 
process through spend analysis.  In 2004, they initiated the Spend Analysis Pilot 
Program.  Although this 90-day pilot was very limited in scope, it was a step in the right 
direction.  The goal of the pilot was to combine several separate databases into a single 
database that could be accessed by DoD commodity teams conducting spend analysis.  
The DoD expected that these teams would be able to use the data provided by the 
database to spot trends in purchasing that would create opportunities for the use of 
strategic sourcing (GAO, 2004). 
Much like companies within industry, the DoD has realized the need for a 
transformation in the way that it does business.  However, there are challenges.  Despite 
roadblocks, companies within the private sector have transformed their business 
processes into more modern ones through automation, setting goals for savings, and using 
metrics to measure progress towards achieving those goals (GAO, 2003, September).  
The DoD will undoubtedly experience similar challenges, albeit on a much larger scale 
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due to its sheer size.  However, industry can serve as a model for the DoD to implement 
its own transformation.  For example, the GAO identified several broad principles that 
were critical to industry success.  Despite the different methods employed to achieve 
success among the companies that the GAO studied, the same basic practices were 
common among them (GAO, 2003, September).  Table 3 describes each of those 
common principles. 
 
Table 3.   Broad Principles and Practices of Strategic Sourcing at Leading Companies 
(GAO, 2003, September) 
 
 
G. EVOLUTION IN THE DOD’S SOURCING STRATEGY 
Since 2004 when it implemented its Spend Analysis Pilot Program, the DoD has 
continued to commit itself to a change in the way that it does business.  In 2009, the DoD 
completed its first department-wide spend analysis for equipment and supplies (DoD, 
2009).  This spend analysis, along with a strategic plan developed by the DoD, has paved 
the way for a strategic sourcing strategy for service contracts. 
The DoD seems to be following the four broad principles of strategic sourcing 
that the GAO identified as common among companies within industry, listed in Table 3.   
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Each of these basic practices has proven to be critical to the success of a transformation 
to a more strategic approach to procurement and has led to significant savings, as well as 
improvements in the services that these companies are receiving (GAO, 2003, 
September). 
1. Commitment 
The DoD’s commitment to a transformation really began with the 2002 Defense 
Authorization Act.  This act, also known as Public Law 107-107, laid out a requirement 
for the DoD to establish a new management structure for the procurement of services.  In 
addition, the act called for a data collection system that would provide management 
information for services purchased within the DoD (U.S. Congress, 2001).  This 
congressional commitment to change has resulted in the establishment of the Strategic 
Sourcing Directors Board (SSDB).  The SSDB is responsible for providing the direction, 
goals, and guidance for the implementation of the DoD’s strategic sourcing vision (DoD, 
2009).   
The DoD’s commitment is further evidenced by the establishment of the Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Office of Strategic Sourcing (DPAP/SS).  In 2008, 
this office established a charter that identified board members and outlined the roles and 
responsibilities of those members (DoD, 2009).  Members of the board include 
representatives from all of the military departments and other defense agencies.  In 
addition, the board includes advisors from such agencies as the Office of Small Business 
and the Defense Acquisition University (DoD, 2009).  This board further emphasizes the 
DoD’s commitment to a transformation to a more strategic approach to procurement for 
both goods and services.  
2. Knowledge 
The DPAP/SS is tasked with conducting annual spend analyses on the 
procurement of supplies and services throughout the DoD in order to provide accurate 
data in support of strategic sourcing efforts.  It is anticipated that these analyses will 
result in procurement trends.  This will help the DoD identify goods and services that  
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could be procured using strategic sourcing. In addition, the reports generated from these 
analyses have the potential to show whether a sourcing decision was the right one (DoD, 
2009). 
The knowledge gained from the spend analysis that was conducted by the 
DPAP/SS allowed them to identify eight broad categories of services that would benefit 
from strategic sourcing decisions and to organize them using a portfolio approach (DoD, 
2009).  In 2008, the DPAP/SS abandoned their portfolio approach and implemented goals 
and objectives through the Strategic Plan for the Strategic Sourcing of Services.  This 
strategic plan was intended to transform the DoD’s procurement culture to one that uses 
strategic approaches for acquiring goods and services (DoD, 2009).  The DoD conducted 
a spend analysis to gain knowledge of what was being purchased by agencies within the 
DoD, as well as to gain knowledge of how much was being spent; doing so was critical to 
achieving the DoD’s transformation goals. 
3. Change and Support 
 For the DoD, the commitment has been made and knowledge has been gained 
through a comprehensive spend analysis.  What is required now is to create an 
environment throughout the DoD that will foster a change in the procurement culture.  
The DoD will need to continue to support its agencies through the change.  Undoubtedly, 
there will be some resistance to such a radical transformation.  However, through support, 
communication, and training, the DoD can achieve compliance with its new objectives 
(GAO, 2003, June). 
 In industry, companies faced similar challenges in achieving buy-in from its 
employees.  To foster this change, companies restructured their organizations and gave 
their procurement organizations more responsibility and authority.  In addition, they set 
realistic goals and used metrics with which those goals could be measured (GAO, 2003, 
June). 
 A change in the way the DoD does business may require a change in core 
competencies that are needed to successfully implement those changes.  The DoD-wide 
Strategic Sourcing Program has a primary objective to improve the skills of the DoD 
workforce by using processes and resources similar to those used in industry (Rendon, 
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2005).  Decreases in staffing, greater workloads on DoD employees as a result of the War 
on Terror, and this shift to a more strategic approach to procurement will force the DoD 
to identify the skills required of its acquisition workforce that will allow the DoD to meet 
the challenges associated with such a transformation (GAO, 2003, June).  
 Once the DoD has identified the core competencies required of its procurement 
force, it can begin to provide training to that force.  This training, combined with the 
assistance from leadership in overcoming obstacles to success, as well as the 
establishment and communication of goals and metrics, will result in buy-in of the new 
strategic policy throughout the DoD (GAO, 2002, August).   
H. POTENTIAL SAVINGS OF STRATEGIC SOURCING IN DOD 
 At the agency level, the DoD has already experienced some success with strategic 
sourcing.  Several examples will illustrate the positive effects of a strategic effort for the 
purchase of goods and services within the DoD. 
1. Department of the Air Force 
One of the first uses of a strategic approach to procurement occurred in 2003 
(Rendon, 2005).  The Air Force was able to leverage its purchase of computer products, 
including both desktops and laptops, with standard features.  In order to achieve this, the 
Air Force’s Information Technology Commodity Council (ITCC), which is tasked with 
the development of procurement strategies for the purchase of IT products and services, 
collected input from Air Force’s major commands.  The result was an agreement on three 
different configurations for one desktop and two notebook computers, of which the Air 
Force planned to purchase 10,000 (Temin, 2003).  In a contract awarded to Dell in 
August 2003, the Air Force was able to leverage its purchase by only contracting for the 
commonly configured machines.  The savings that resulted from this strategy allowed the 
ITCC to purchase 2,500 more computers than they had originally planned, representing 
all unfunded requirements (Rendon, 2005). 
 More recently, the Air Force’s Landing Gear Commodity Council (LGCC) was 
formed in an effort to reduce administrative lead-time for receipt of parts, costs, and the 
number of long-term sole source contracts for landing gear parts (Koenig, 2004).  In 
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2007, the Air Force awarded a multiple-award, Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity 
(IDIQ) contract as a small business set-aside.  Award of this contract, combined with the 
spend analysis that preceded it, permitted the LGCC to exceed its administrative lead-
time goal of 90 days for these parts.  The lead-time achieved in 2008 was 69 days.  In 
addition, the LGCC reduced the number of contracts it held for these parts by 61% 
between 2007 and 2008 (DoD, 2009).  The Air Force anticipates an annual cost reduction 
of more than $8 million through the use of strategic sourcing by the LGCC (DoD, 2009). 
2. Defense Logistics Agency 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has set the bar high in achieving savings 
through the use of strategic sourcing for the procurement of both goods and services.  The 
Strategic Material Sourcing (SMS) Program has been their most successful effort.  Under 
SMS, the DLA conducted a spend analysis on more than three million hardware items 
(Koenig, 2004).  Through this spend analysis process, the DLA identified those items that 
were most critical to its customers (DoD, 2009).  The DLA narrowed their focus to 
320,000 items that were critical to the DoD, and although these items represented only 
12% of all hardware items procured by the DLA, they represented more than 88% of all 
DLA procurement actions (DLA, 2010).  Of those, 156,000 items are currently being 
purchased via long-term contracts.  As a result of this analysis, production lead-time for 
those items has decreased by 63% compared to noncritical hardware items, and material 
availability has increased by 10% (DoD, 2009).  
 The DLA is currently involved in an analysis of how it procures support services 
in an attempt to identify opportunities to strategically source for those services. The DLA 
Contracting Services Office (DSCO) hopes that this will allow the DLA to leverage its 
buying power by combining requirements for similar services at various agency locations 
(DoD, 2009). 
3. Department of the Navy 
The Department of the Navy has also experienced some success with strategic 
approaches to procurement.  Most notably, the Navy has implemented its SeaPort-e 
program. The purpose of this program is to provide a means for contracting support 
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services, such as financial and program management and engineering services (DoD, 
2009).  Currently, Seaport-e boasts more than 1,800 IDIQ contracts, each with multiple 
awardees (Branch, 2010).  In addition, 85% of these contracts have been awarded to 
small businesses.  This effort has resulted in savings of more than 7% in the procurement 
of services to support the Navy (DoD, 2009). 
These examples illustrate that a strategic sourcing approach is possible within the 
DoD.  Through spend analysis, agencies within the DoD have been able to leverage 
purchases by buying common goods or services in bulk, allowing them to realize 
significant savings.  In several cases, this savings was not realized at the expense of small 
business.  In fact, small business played a significant role in both the Air Force LGCC 
procurement and the DLA SMS program.  It is conceivable, then, that strategic sourcing 
of goods and services on a DoD-wide scale could be accomplished through a thorough 
spend analysis program. 
I. STRATEGIC SOURCING TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
 Despite the fact that strategic sourcing has become an accepted policy, academic 
institutions are slow to adjust their curriculums to properly educate the acquisition 
workforce.  The Naval Postgraduate School, for example, offers two curricula containing 
three courses that are specifically focused on strategic sourcing.  One of them is a 
distance learning opportunity offered to military service members and DoD civilians.  
The other is a residence program only offered to Air Force students.  However, Navy 
students are only offered the first course in the series and Army students do not take any 
of the strategic sourcing courses.  In addition, the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
only offers one 4-1/2 hour continuous learning module titled Strategic Sourcing 
Overview, but does not offer an overall curriculum in Strategic Sourcing.  In order to 
implement strategic sourcing approaches to procurement, it is necessary for these 
institutions to train acquisition professionals by modifying their curricula to include the 
relevant training 
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J.   SUMMARY 
Strategic sourcing, as we know it today, is a borrowed idea that originated with 
the Japanese.  Accordingly, the United States has adopted these ideas and made limitless 
attempts to make them even better.  With federal strategic sourcing, however, the 
Department of Defense has arguably taken too long to climb onboard this cost-saving 
initiative.  Strategic sourcing was created by the Japanese to adapt to an expanding 
economy with an intensifying business sector.  Many U.S. companies implemented these 
practices with success; however, the U.S. government has failed to put this into practice 
in a timely fashion due to the barriers of bureaucracy. 
 As the acquisition of services has evolved through the years, the federal 
government has taken steps to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely.  From the 
implementation of the A-76 program to the development of strategic sourcing initiatives, 
regulations and policies have been changed by policy-makers, but not always for the 
better.  With strategic sourcing, the ability to employ industry best practices has become 
critical and the federal government has started to include them into common operating 
practice. 
There are many barriers to the DoD’s transformation of its procurement process to 
a more strategic one.  Challenges include the DoD’s inability to access accurate spend 
data and socio-economic responsibilities that are governed by public law, such as the 
requirements for the use of small businesses.  This report has shown that both companies 
in industry and agencies within the DoD itself have overcome these challenges through 
the use of an extensive spend analysis program. 
 The GAO identified five key processes to effective spend analysis in industry: 
automation, extraction, supplemental information, organization, and analysis and 
strategic goals.  In addition, the GAO identified broad principles used by leading 
companies to implement a strategic approach to the procurement of goods and services.  
Those principles include commitment, knowledge, change, and support (DoD, 2009).  
The DoD seems to be adapting these principles to its own transformation.  First, it is 
establishing policy and securing commitment from top leaders.  Second, the DoD has 
conducted spend analysis, at both the department and agency levels, in an attempt to 
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identify opportunities to implement strategic sourcing initiatives.  Certainly, there will be 
resistance to this transformation; however, the DoD is on the right track to thwart 
resistance by identifying organizations to manage strategic purchase in the form of 
commodity teams, and by establishing relationships between stakeholders.  In addition, 
the DoD has established goals and metrics with which to track progress towards those 
goals (GAO, 2004). 
 Finally, there are many examples within the DoD of successful strategic efforts.  
Some of these even proved that barriers, such as socio-economic concerns, can be 
overcome through the use of a detailed spend analysis.  In those cases, competition was 
not compromised, and small businesses were a major part of the resulting contracts.  
These agencies continue to develop innovative ways to procure goods and services and 
experience tremendous cost savings, while still meeting the requirements of the public 
laws and statues that often hinder government procurement. 
This chapter presented a literature review in which the origin of strategic sourcing 
was examined.  We provided a foundation of strategic sourcing principles and how they 
apply to the acquisition of services in the Department of Defense and specifically to the 
Navy.  The following chapter describes NAVFAC’s organization, its overall strategy, and 
its contracting method.  Because the data used in this study is provided by NAVFAC, it is 




III. NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the data used in this study was provided by NAVFAC, it is important that 
the reader have a fundamental understanding of the NAVFAC organization and how it 
operates its respective regions.  This chapter provides an in depth description of 
NAVFAC’s organization, its overall strategy, and its contracting method.   
 Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Headquarters is located at the 
Navy Yard in Washington, DC.  Nearly 450 personnel are assigned to NAVFAC 
Headquarters, including a mixture of active and reserve officers, active and reserve 
enlisted military, and civilians.  NAVFAC Headquarters is an Echelon II command led 
by a Rear Admiral who reports operationally to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and 
administratively to both the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy for Real Estate and 
Contracts Authority. 
B. ORGANIZATION 
 It would be utterly impossible for the mission of NAVFAC to be executed solely 
by the personnel at its headquarters; therefore, many subordinate field components have 
been established and are under the command of NAVFAC Headquarters.  These are 
composed of both Echelon III and IV commands, with both general and specialty 
functions.  NAVFAC’s Echelon III commands consist of NAVFAC Atlantic and 
NAVFAC Pacific, and the specialty centers of Naval Facilities Engineering Service 
Center, Naval Facilities Expeditionary Logistics Center, and the Navy Crane Center.  In 
addition, there are numerous Echelon IV commands under the control of NAVFAC 
Atlantic and Pacific.  NAVFAC Atlantic oversees NAVFAC Mid-Atlantic, Washington, 
Midwest, Southwest, Southeast, Northwest, Europe, Southwest Asia.  NAVFAC Pacific 




Figure 3.   NAVFAC Organizational Chart 
(NAVFAC, 2008) 
C. HISTORY 
 The original organization was established in 1842 and was known as the Bureau 
of Yards and Docks (BuDocks).  At this time, BuDocks was responsible for virtually all 
buildings and equipment, boats, police, and contracts that were associated with any of the 
seven Navy yards scattered along the east coast of the United States (NAVFAC, 2008).  
Numerous Navy yards were added throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, with 
preparations for the Civil War and World War I and II.  This increase in funding allowed 
the Navy to expand and build additional yards not only in various strategic locations 
throughout the east and west coasts of the United States, but also all through Europe and 
Southeast Asia. 
 By 1911, BuDocks was to assume even more responsibility.  Congress enacted a 
law stating that BuDocks would be responsible for both the design and construction of all 
Navy public works.  This was followed by Navy regulations in 1913 that declared, “The 
duties of the Bureau of Yards and Docks shall comprise the design and construction of 
the public works and public utilities of the Navy and their repair, upkeep, and operation” 
(NAVFAC, 2008).  Moreover, during this same time period, BuDocks made a significant 
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change to the way it managed its projects.  The role of project managers was created, and 
because of this, each project within BuDocks was assigned a project manager who would 
supervise his or her respective projects from cradle to grave.   
 BuDocks made its first significant organizational restructuring in the early 1940s.  
This new organizational plan was created by one of the most illustrious Civil Engineering 
Officers (CEC), Rear Admiral Ben Moreell.  His new plan would partition BuDocks into 
five main sectors: “Planning and Design, Construction, Administration and Personnel, 
Progress Control and Statistical, and Finance and Operating” (NAVFAC, 2008).  Another 
important change that he implemented affected how the designs for public works 
construction projects were created and who would create them.  As stated earlier, all 
designs were to be created by BuDocks for these sorts of projects; however, the 
preparation required to enter World War II created more requirements of BuDocks.  
These necessities stretched the bureau’s engineers too thin, and, as a result, contracts 
were written to have civilian architectural engineers build the designs for these 
construction projects.  This change paved the way for BuDocks to write contracts for 
private engineering companies to both design and build a majority of the required public 
works construction projects. 
 BuDocks grew even larger following the attack by Japan on our naval base in 
Pearl Harbor.  Funding for BuDocks skyrocketed, and shore facility construction 
increased worldwide as a result.  Moreover, construction projects were required inside 
combat zones, but the majority of civilian contractors were unwilling to perform in this 
environment.  In response to this shortfall in the combat zones, BuDocks created an 
organization called the Seabees.  Creation of the Seabees in 1942 required BuDocks to 
actively recruit 325,000 personnel, most of whom were employees of companies the 
government had previously contracted with.  This growth continued throughout World 
War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. 
 As the Vietnam War drew to a close, funding was decreased for shore installation 
construction and upkeep.  In addition, there were other major organizational realignments 
within the Department of the Navy (DoN).  As a result of this restructuring, the DoN 
made the decision to give BuDocks a new name.  BuDocks was now identified as 
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NAVFAC and reported directly to the Commander of Naval Material Command (NMC), 
until NMC was later decommissioned during Ronald Reagan’s presidency.  After this 
point, “NAVFAC began reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations” (NAVFAC, 
2008). 
 Navy Installations Command (CNI) was introduced and established in 2003.  The 
formation of CNI resulted in a fundamental transformation in the role NAVFAC would 
play in all future shore installation command construction and maintenance.  Immediately 
following CNI’s founding, it was charged with “providing a unified program, policy, and 
funding management for all naval shore installations” (NAVFAC, 2008).  In addition, 
according to NAVFAC’s Command Annual Operations Report, it would now be 
responsible for assisting CNI in all areas of NAVFAC’s expertise.  NAVFAC supported 
CNI by managing the planning, design, acquisition, and construction of facilities for U.S. 
Navy activities throughout the world.  NAVFAC also provided CNI with technical 
expertise and services related to real estate, utilities, facilities maintenance, shore-based 
environmental programs, and technical and program support for the Navy Seabees. 
  Finally, in 2004 another organizational restructuring took place.  This change 
focused on consolidation and efficiency, rather than on lines of authority and 
responsibility.  Because of this, NAVFAC was able to champion CNI more effectively 
and efficiently.  As stated in NAVFAC’s Command Annual Operations Report, 
The most important feature of this transformation was the combining of 
former engineering field divisions, officer-in-charge of construction 
organizations, and Public Works Centers (PWC) in to regional Facilities 
Engineering Commands (FEC) who reported directly to NAVFAC 
Atlantic or Pacific for their primary duty, and to their respective regional 
commanders for any additional duties. (NAVFAC, 2008) 
 
This most recent organizational change resulted in a 60% reduction in Echelon III and IV 
commands.  It took two full years for the NAVFAC organization to complete this 
realignment (see Tables 4 and 5).  As written in their command report, NAVFAC’s final 
command disposition is illustrated in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4.   NAVFAC Commands 
(NAVFAC, 2008) 
Naval Facilities Commands 
Command Location Established Echelon Consolidated 






July 23, 2004 IV - Engineering Field 
Activity Chesapeake 
- PWC Washington 
NAVFAC Mid-
Atlantic 
Norfolk, Virginia July 30, 2004 IV - PWC Norfolk 












July 8, 2005 IV - PWC Great Lakes 






August 2, 2005 IV - Engineering Field 
Division Southwest 











June 2, 2006 IV - PWC Jacksonville 




NAVFAC Pacific Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii 
June 18, 2004 III N/A 
NAVFAC Far East Yokosuka, Japan July 30, 2004 IV - PWC Yokosuka 
- Officer-in-Charge 




Guam February 25, 
2005 




NAVFAC Hawaii Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii 
March 10, 2005 IV - PWC Hawaii 
- ROICC Pearl 
Harbor and Marine 







Table 5.   NAVFAC Specialty Centers 
(NAVFAC, 2008) 
Specialty Centers 
Command (Echelon III) Location Function 
Naval Facilities Engineering 
Service Center (NAVFAC 
ESC) 
Port Hueneme, California - Research and development for 
shore facilities 




Center (NAVFAC ELC) 
Port Hueneme, California - Logistical support to Naval 
Construction Force 
Navy Crane Center (NCC) Norfolk, Virginia - Manages weight-handling 
equipment for all naval shore 
activities 
- Acquires all cranes for the 
Navy 
- Engineering expertise on crane-
related issues 
 
D. CURRENT OPERATIONS 
 Today, NAVFAC is operated within the concept of a matrix organization.  There 
are six Business Lines (BL) and four Support Lines (SL) within the NAVFAC 
organization (see Figure 4) (NAVFAC, 2008).  BLs include Expeditionary, Asset 
Management, Capital Improvements, Public Works, Environmental, and Contingency 
Engineering, whereas SLs include Financial Management, Command Information 
Officer, Counsel, and Acquisition.  In this chapter, we discuss only the Acquisition SL 
and do not describe any other BL or SL in further detail. 
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Figure 4.   NAVFAC Headquarters Organizational Chart 
(NAVFAC, 2008) 
 
 NAVFAC Headquarters Acquisition Directorate (ACQ) takes care of all 
supporting activities and business processes of its Echelon III and IV commands 
throughout the world.  According to its Operations Report: 
NAVFAC Acquisition performs a critical role in Military Construction, 
Environmental Restoration, Base Realignment and Closure, Navy 
Housing, Contingency Engineering, Seabee Readiness, Base Operations 
and Support, and Utility Rate Intervention worldwide.  During FY 2008, 
NAVFAC accomplished nearly 40 thousand actions in support of their 
clients valued at over $9.8 billion. (NAVFAC, 2008) 
 
In fact, there are nearly 1,800 personnel in the NAVFAC acquisition community, to 
include: Active Duty Military, GS1102 (Contract Specialist and Procurement Analyst), 
GS1105 (Purchasing Agent), GS1106 (Procurement Technician), and GS1130 (Public 
Utility Specialist) (NAVFAC, 2008).  This workforce is composed of 900 civilians and 
853 Active Duty Military, of which 719 and 622, respectively, are certified to their 
required Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) level (NAVFAC, 
2008).   
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E. NAVFAC CONTRACTS 
NAVFAC provides material support for mobile utility support equipment; 
materials and equipment for defense against chemical, biological, and radiological 
attacks; railway equipment; construction; subsurface ocean structures; floating cranes; 
and sealift support systems.  In addition, NAVFAC provides technical support to include 
technical services for economic analysis; supporting the Chief of Naval Operations with 
maintenance and operations programs that directly aide the U.S. Congress; and 
coordinating site approvals (NAVFAC, 2008).  Their contractual requirements also 
include providing advice and assistance with fire protection engineering; energy 
conservation program formulation; minor construction and repair; numerous services 
related to the maintenance of shore establishments; operating and maintaining utilities; 
and various operating services that include grounds, structures, and building maintenance 
(NAVFAC, 2008).          
F. SUMMARY 
We provided a necessary in-depth look at the NAVFAC organization, its history, 
and contracting environment in this chapter.   This was necessary in order to enable our 
readers to have a better fundamental understanding of their operations throughout the 
world and how it could be possible for them to take advantage of what strategic sourcing 
has to offer.  The next chapter provides a description of the model that was developed for 
the Air Force and how it applies to service-based strategic sourcing.  It also details the 




IV. SERVICE-BASED STRATEGIC SOURCING MODEL 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The research provided by Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón was pivotal to the thesis. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the model that they developed and how it 
applies to service-based strategic sourcing.  This chapter also details the process in which 
we organized the data provided by NAVFAC in such a way that it could be easily entered 
to the pricing optimization model (PO).   
Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón have recently developed a PO model, which they 
applied to contract award data provided to them by the United States Air Force.  This 
model was developed to support the Air Force’s strategic sourcing initiative (Apte et al., 
2009).  Their conclusions yielded a significant cost savings through the use of the PO 
model.  We applied similar contract award data, provided to us by NAVFAC, to this 
model in support of NAVFAC’s own strategic sourcing initiatives. 
B.   STRATEGIC PURCHASING 
The Navy realized its recent successes in strategic purchasing by using a method 
that was developed through the use of a basic contract management process. Apte, 
Rendon, and Salmerón (2009) identified the same process as critical to the development 
of the Air Force’s model.   The process includes six phases (Rendon & Snider, 2008), 
each of which is discussed below. 
Procurement Planning: This phase of contract management involves the critical 
process of identifying the requirement through the use of Commodity Councils.  
According to Rendon and Snider (2008), Commodity Councils this phase is achieved by 
defining the requirement, conducting market research, and developing requirements 
documents such as the Statement of Work (SOW) or the Performance Work Statement 
(PWS).  They determine preliminary cost estimates of the required goods or services.  
Contract type should be considered during this phase, along with the potential risks 
associated with the requirement.   
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Solicitation Planning: In this phase, documents required to support the solicitation 
are prepared.  Documentation completed in this phase includes those that detail the 
program requirements, describe the competition environment, and identify which sources 
are potentially qualified to satisfy the requirement (Apte et al., 2009). 
Solicitation: Solicitation, according to Rendon and Snider (2008), is the process 
of obtaining proposals from offerors who feel that they can meet the requirement.  To 
accomplish this, the requirement must be advertised and the solicitation must be posted 
for public access.  This advertisement helps to ensure that competition is increased and 
that industry participation in meeting DoD requirements is broadened (Rendon & Snider, 
2008). 
Source Selection: This phase first involves the selection of the supplier that best 
meets the requirements.  This is determined through the use of evaluation criteria, which 
are applied to areas such as cost and the technical and management portions of each 
offeror’s proposal.  Second, Rendon and Snider (2008) inform us that negotiating with 
offerors is an important step during the source selection process.  These negotiations are 
conducted in an attempt to come to an agreement on every aspect of the contract between 
the government and the offeror. 
Contract Administration: This phase includes such activities as monitoring 
contractor performance, processing payments, and managing any changes that are made 
to the contract.  These activities help to ensure that a contractor is meeting the cost, 
schedule, and performance requirements of the contract (Apte et al., 2009). 
Contract Closeout: This is the final phase of the contract management process.  
This complicated phase involves not only making the final payment, but also other items 
such as the acceptance of a final product, disposition of government property, 
reconciliation of unliquidated damages, and patent rights reports.  The closeout of a 
contract is relatively simple, as long as the contract administration phase was conducted 
properly.  If it was not, then closeout could be hindered by unresolved VE issues, 
undetermined final indirect cost rates, unresolved “questionable” costs, or outstanding or 
unresolved claims. 
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This basic contract management process sets the foundation for the Navy’s 
strategic sourcing model.  Strategic sourcing typically employs a negotiated procurement 
method, which is usually reserved for source selection approaches that are more complex 
(Apte et al., 2009).  Strategic sourcing also typically uses a trade-off evaluation strategy.  
In their model, Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón utilize a Performance-price Tradeoff (PPT) 
strategy.   This type of strategy is often used for installation-level services.  When it is in 
the best interest of the government to award, or consider award of, a contract to an offeror 
that does not offer the lowest price, or is not the highest technically rated offeror, a trade-
off strategy may be appropriate (GSA et al., 2005, Part 15.401-1(a)).  This type of 
strategy allows the government to achieve a best-value source selection and, additionally, 
permits trade-offs to be made “among cost or price and non-cost factors and allows the 
government to accept other than the lowest priced proposal” (GSA et al., 2005, Part 
15.401-1(c)).    
C.   EVALUATION CRITERIA 
 Watt, Kayis, and Willey (2007) identified eight principle categories of non-cost 
evaluation criteria.  They identified these categories through a survey of more than 50 
program managers, directors, and general managers, with ranges of experience between 2 
to 40 years (Watt et al., 2007).  A look at the table indicates that there are many non-cost 
factors that evaluators should take into consideration.  A determination of whether these 
non-cost factors warrant the government’s acceptance of any proposal other than the 
lowest price one would have to be determined on an individual requirement basis.    
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Table 6.   Principal Evaluation Categories of Criteria 
(Watt et al., 2007) 
Category Specific criteria 
Organization 
Experience 
Past or Similar Experience, Market Familiarity, Commercial Experience, 
Understanding of Regulations, Related Experience, Size and Type of Projects 
Completed, Yrs in Similar Projects 
Workload/Capacity 
Current Commitments, Available Manpower, Plant and Equipment Capacity, 
Current Resource Workload, Equipment Resources, Contractor Capacity, 
Capacity for Assuming New Projects 
Project Management 
Expertise 
Controls Cost, Project Management Ability, Management Competencies, 
Management Structure, Scope and Risk Control, Project Management 
Organization and Skills, Project Management Qualifications, Project 
Management Monitoring and Controls 
Past Project 
Performance 
Ability to Deliver, Demonstrated Performance, Track Record, Past Performance, 
Reliability, Cost Outcomes or Overruns, Past Failures, Performance History, 
Schedule Performance, Results from Previous Projects 
Company Standing 
(Reputation) 
Company Reputation, Organizational Maturity or Stability, References, 
Responsiveness, Business Ethics, Amount of Past Business, Company Image and 
Size, Trade Union Record, Litigation Tendency, Reputation 
Client–Supplier 
Relations 
Ability to Work as Team, Stakeholder Management, Customer 
Focus/Relationship, Client/Customer Attitude and Relations, Trust, Commitment 
to Support, Responsiveness 
Technical Expertise 
Availability and Experience of Technical Design Experts, Availability of 
Technical Experts, Key Technical Staff Experience, Experience of Technical 
Personnel, Technical Competence and Ability 
Method/Technical 
Solution 
Compliance with Stated Needs or Requirements, Proposed System Solution, 
Plant/Equipment Type, Viability of Technical Solution, Technology Base, 
Proposed Design, Functionality, Life Cycle Requirements, Technological Growth 
Capability 
 
In their model, Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón (2009) used past-performance 
information as part of the equation to help determine best value.  When using a PPT 
approach, the offerors’ recent and relevant past performance is evaluated.  This 
evaluation is conducted after all of the offerors’ technical proposals have been reviewed 
and determined acceptable and after the price of those proposals has been deemed 
reasonable. Those acceptable proposals are then ranked based on total evaluated price 
(Apte et al., 2009).  The past performance evaluation results in the assignment of one of 
the following performance confidence assessment ratings (Apte et al., 2009): 
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1.  Substantial Confidence:  Based on the offeror’s performance record, 
the government has a high expectation that the offeror will successfully perform the 
required effort. 
2.  Satisfactory Confidence:  Based on the offeror’s performance record, 
the government has an expectation that the offeror will successfully perform the 
required effort. 
3.  Limited Confidence:  Based on the offeror’s performance record, the 
government has a low expectation that the offeror will successfully perform the 
required effort. 
4.  No Confidence:  Based on the offeror’s performance record, the 
government has no expectation that the offeror will be able to successfully 
perform the required effort. 
5.  Unknown Confidence:  No performance record is identifiable, or the 
offeror’s performance record is so limited that no confidence assessment rating 
can be reasonably assigned. 
Using the performance-price trade-off approach and the above ratings, if the 
lowest-priced/technically acceptable offeror also received a past-performance rating of 
Substantial Confidence, that offeror would represent the best value to the government.  
However, if the lowest-priced/technically acceptable offeror did not acheive a 
performance rating of Substantial Confidence, then the next lowest-priced/technically 
acceptable offeror with a performance rating of Substanial Confidence would be selected 
for award of the contract (Apte et al., 2009).  In addition, as long as the solicitation 
specifies, the government has the right to award a contract to the higher-priced offeror if 
that offeror has a higher confidence rating than the lower-priced offeror.  The next 
section describes the set-covering problem that is the foundation of the PO model which 
uses a performance, price trade-off approach. 
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D. SET-COVERING PROBLEM 
The set-covering problem (SCP) addresses the use of strategic sourcing for 
pricing of proposals that are submitted for multiple installations by offerors who meet the 
technical requirements of a solicitation (Apte et al., 2009).   
SCP has many uses.  However, it is frequently applied to locations of facilities 
such as locations of warehouses in a supply chain or the locations of fire stations and 
hospitals.  In addition, the SCP can be applied to the location of schools, libraries 
(Toregas, Swain, ReVelle & Bergman, 1970), warehouses, and manufacturing plants as 
described in any supply chain literature.  One such example occurred in 2001 when the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) identified a requirement for the 
strategic placement of Disaster Recovery Centers (DRC) in every county in Florida.  In 
response to this requirement, the Aluchua county Emergency Management Division 
formed a project team, tasked with the identification of the best location(s) for these DRC 
sites.  To determine the ideal locations, the team applied a SCPand the result was an 
optimal set of DRCs throughout Alachua county. 
In an SCP, a finite set is created and identified as U.  In addition, a family of 
subsets is given and labeled S.  The goal of the sub-family of S is that which yields the 
minimum total cost.  This sub-family is identified as a “cover,” C ⊂ S, and the union of 
all of the sets in C is U (Apte et al., 2009).  If for s ∈ S incurs a fixed cost c(s) is the cost 
the SCP can be formulated as follows: 
SCP:  




∑     (1) 
subject to  
|
1,s
s S u s
X u U
∈ ∈
≥ ∈∑    (2) 
   { }0,1 ,sX s S∈ ∀ ∈    (3) 
 
Equation 1 minimizes the total cost of the cover, while Equation 2 is constructed 
to assure that every element within the finite set U is covered by at least one of the 
subsets in the cover.  Finally, Equation 3 identifies each subset as either in or out of the 
cover.  This is accomplished by assigning a value of 0 or 1 to Xs: 
 Xs = 0, if the subset is not identified as being in the cover. 
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 Xs = 1, if the subset is identified as being in the cover (s = 1, 2,…, n). 
 
Xs is referred to as a zero-one integer variable.  What that specifies is that values for Xs 
other than zero or one are not be accepted in the solution to the problem. 
 The SCP can be used to model the strategic sourcing for pricing proposals that are 
submitted by technically compliant offerors on multiples installations.  The price 
optimization (PO) model developed by Apte, Rendon and Salmerón (2009) used an 
adapted version of the SCP.   
E. USE OF THE MODEL 
In the data provided by NAVFAC, the universal set consists of all of the offers 
that were submitted for base services, including both single and multiple contract types.  
Table 4 illustrates all of the possible proposals for a scenario in which there are two 
offerors submitting proposals for three installations.  In this example, there are 14 
possible combinations of proposals.  However, in the model, offerors may not submit 
proposals on all of the possible proposals (due to schedule constraints, limited 
capabilities, or even constraints that might be imposed on the offerors by the 
government).  One type of constraint imposed by the government might be the number of 
installations that an offeror is allowed to include in a single proposal.  This particular 
constraint is an additional constraint in SPC that is included in the PO model (Apte et al., 
2009), and this is used as a parameter in the evaluation of our NAVFAC data.   
 The main reason for this type of bidding strategy is to maximize price discount by 
taking advantage of economies of scale or location as validated by Apte, Rendon, and 
Salmerón.  The PO model attempts to prove that the sum of Proposals 1 and 2 for 
installations 1 and 2 is higher than a single proposal that includes both installations 1 and 
2. 
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Table 7.   Possible Bids 
(Apte et al., 2009) 
 
 
In the PO model, the goal is for the authority to select the proposals that best 
represent the strategy it has established—subject to one of the model’s primary 
constraints—that all of the installations receive the required services (Apte et al., 2009).  
For example, the strategy might be to select the offeror that represents the highest CPL, 
regardless of cost.  Realistically, however, some type of compromise must be made 
between the performance and cost objectives (Apte et al., 2009).  In other words, it is best 
if the authority must consider both cost and past performance. 
 For our evaluation of the NAVFAC data using the PO model, we utilized the 
same underlying assumptions made by Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón in their problem.  
We made these assumptions to simplify scenarios.  In addition, we continued to use five 
installations as the maximum number of installations that a single offeror can bid on.  The 
remaining assumptions are listed below (Apte et al., 2009): 
1. Each offeror bids on numerous bids, but the maximum 
number of installations, n, in a bid is fixed (in this case n=5). 
 
2. All offerors offer the same percentage of quantity discounts 
that are based on number of installations included in the bid. 
 
3. All installations have the same preference in CPL of the 
offerors. 
 For consistency, we utilized the same notation used in the Apte, Rendon, and 
Salmerón (2009) model.  This notation is provided below: 
I   set of installations, for i I∈ ; 
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C   set of offerors (contractors), for c C∈ ; 
B   set of bids, for b B∈ ; 
iB B⊂   subset of bids that contain installation i 
bI I⊂   subset of installations in bid b; 
bc C∈   offeror for bid b; 
bp   price of bid b [$]; 
cv  performance rating of offeror c [rating] (the lower the rating, the 
better the performance); 
w  penalty weight of performance with respect to cost [$/performance 
rating]; 
ih  penalty factor to reflect importance of having a good performance 
offeror for installation i [multiplicative factor]; and 
bx  binary decision variable: 1 if bid b is selected, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 As mentioned previously, the PO model is used to determine optimal offeror and 
bidding selection through the use of a SCP.  We used Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón’s SCP 
model to evaluate the offeror data provided by NAVFAC.  The SCP model is provided 
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 Unlike the data provided to Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón (2009) by the U.S. Air 
Force, the data provided to us by NAVFAC did not contain combined bids by any 
offeror.  As a result, we utilized the process proposed by Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón to 
create those combined bids. 
Let: 
cI I⊂   subset of installations for which contractor c places individual 
bids;  
cip   price bid by offeror c on installation i, for  ,ci I c C∈ ∈  [$]; 
n  maximum number of individual bids in a combined bid (pre-
specified); and 
ckr  discount rate offered by offeror c if awarded k installations 
simultaneously. 
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Process: Generate Cluster Bids 
 For each offeror, c C∈ { 







⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 { 
Add a new bid identifier b (e.g., a bid counter 
index) to set B;  
- Generate the lth  (combined) bid b, which has 
exactly k installations from Ic; 
- Update set Bi for installations in the just-
generated bid; and  
- Update the cost of the combined bid by using 








     }}}   End process. 
 
F. IMPLEMENTATION 
In the analysis, we maintain confidentiality for both installations and offerors.  To 
simplify the specific scenario, we broke down the data into seven regions that align with 
those established by NAVFAC’s organizational structure.  After we organized the 
contract data by region, we determined that the price optimization model could not be 
applied to four of the seven regions due to the fact that each offeror bid on a single 
installation.  In other words, there were no multiple bids.  Tables 8, 9, and 10 illustrate 












Table 8.   Single Bids for Location FE 






















BO $8,005,609  
 
 













BJ $7,341,446  
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Table 10.   Single Bids for Location SW 




BS $12,500  
 
Table 11 illustrates the discount rates given by offerors based on bids for multiple 
installations.  These discounts are changed based on the particular acquisition strategy 
chosen contract managers.  In order to implement the development of the mathematical 
model, we assigned numerical values to CPL, as shown in Table 12 (Apte et al., 2009). 
 
Table 11.   Discounts by Offerors 
(Apte et al., 2009) 
 
 
Table 12.   Numerical Values for CPL 
(Apte et al., 2009) 
 
 
Based on the information provided by NAVFAC with regard to offeror past 
performance, each offeror was assigned a numerical value for CPL, as shown in Table 
12.  When assigning this CPL, it is important for the reader to remember that the lower 
the number, the better the CPL.  The numerical values for CPL that we assigned to 





























BO 4  
 






















BS 4  
 
 
Two processes can be identified as a benchmark process to compare with the 
optimal strategy.  The first selection process selects the lowest monetary offer, without 
taking CPL into consideration.  In other words, the bidder with the lowest price would be 
awarded the contract, irrespective of his performance level.  The second process takes 
into consideration both CPL and cost.  In this process, the offeror with the best CPL is 
given preference.  In the event of a tie between two or more offerors with to the same 
CPL, the offeror with the lowest cost would be selected for award. 
 Since the aforementioned processes are not ideal, the PO model uses the 
“Generate Cluster Bids” process (Apte et al., 2009).  This process allows the model not 
only to take into consideration the single bids in each region, but also considers combined 
bids.  Region FE, for example, consisted of twenty-two offerors and seven installations, 
for a total of twenty-four single bids.  In addition, the “Generate Cluster Bids” process 
spawned twenty-six combined bids.  Similarly, Region HA contained sixteen offerors for 
three installations, totaling fifteen single bids.  The number of combined bids created by 
the same process was eighteen.  Finally, Region SW was made up of four offerors, four 
installations, and four single bids.  The model’s cluster bid generator produced four 
combined bids. 
 In the PO objective, a weight (α) was assigned to CPL in order to combine cost as 
well as CPL.  Our analysis used one scenario, α = 1,000,000, which places moderate 
emphasis on CPL.   In an ideal situation where multiple offerors bid for multiple 
installations, varying α makes a difference in the solution (Apte et al., 2009).  However, 




 Because the research provided by Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón was pivotal to our 
study, this chapter described their model and how it applies to service-based strategic 
sourcing.  This chapter also detailed the process we used to organize the data provided by 
NAVFAC in such a way that it could be entered into the PO model more easily.  The next 
chapter provides a comparison of the results of the PO model to the results of both the 




























V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter makes a comparison of the PO model results to both the lowest cost 
and best CPL selection processes.  The lowest cost selection process is referred to as 
“selection 1.”   The best CPL selection process is referred to as “selection 2.” 
B. RESULTS 
 Results from the current selection processes 1 and 2, for each of the NAVFAC 
regions we analyzed, are shown in Tables 14 through 16.  For Region FE, selection 1 
yielded a Total Confidence in Performance Level (TCPL) of 25, for a cost of $8,296,730.  
Selection 2 for Region FE yielded the same TCPL and cost.  For Region HA, selection 1 
yielded a TCPL of 6, for a cost of $27,460,612.  Selection 2 for Region HA yielded a 
TCPL of 3, for a cost of $29,764,928.  Region SW yielded a TCPL of 12, for a cost of 
$13,421,851 in both selections 1 and 2.   
C. ANALYSIS 
 The results for Regions FE and SW show that there are no savings realized by 
varying the prioritization of selection between lowest cost and best CPL.  Installation FE1 
was a single offeror, and, with no competition, they would have been chosen for both 
selection 1 and 2.  Installation FE2 remained unchanged from selection 1 to selection 2 
because they were both the lowest bidder and had the best CPL of the two offerors.  For 
Installations FE3 through FE7, all of the offerors had the same CPL, and, therefore, 
selection process 2 would have yielded to the lowest priced offeror.  Installations SW1 
through SW4 were all single bid contracts.  Therefore, selection processes 1 and 2 would 
have yielded the same results. 
 Region HA shows that selection process 1 has a TCPL of 6, which is an average 
CPL of 2 per installation (“Good” confidence level).  Selection process 2, which places 
emphasis on best CPL, has a TCPL of 3, for an average CPL of 1 per installation 
(“Excellent” confidence level).  However, selection by best CPL results in an additional 




Table 16.   Results from Selections 1 (Lowest Cost) & 2 (Best CPL) for Region FE 
Selection 1: Results
Installation Offeror CPL Cost
FE1 J 4 535,870.00     
FE2 K 1 2,235,272.00  
FE3 N 4 7,366.54          
FE4 T 4 2,874.00          
FE5 V 4 141,800.00     
FE6 Y 4 309,100.00     
FE7 BM 4 5,064,448.00  
Total 25 8,296,730.54    
Selection 2: Results
Installation Offeror CPL Cost
FE1 J 4 535,870.00     
FE2 K 1 2,235,272.00  
FE3 N 4 7,366.54          
FE4 T 4 2,874.00          
FE5 V 4 141,800.00     
FE6 Y 4 309,100.00     
FE7 BM 4 5,064,448.00  
Total 25 8,296,730.54    
 
Table 17.   Results from Selections 1 (Lowest Cost) & 2 (Best CPL) for Region HA 
Selection 1: Results
Installation Offeror CPL Cost
HA1 AE 1 7,984,868.18    
HA2 AJ 1 14,390,478.65  
HA3 BH 4 5,085,265.60    
Total 6 27,460,612.43    
Selection 2: Results
Installation Offeror CPL Cost
HA1 AE 1 7,984,868.18    
HA2 AJ 1 14,390,478.65  
HA3 AE 1 7,389,581.24    
Total 3 29,764,928.07    
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Table 18.    Results from Selections 1 (Lowest Cost) & 2 (Best CPL) for Region SW 
Selection 1: Results
Installation Offeror CPL Cost
SW1 AU 2 808,786.65        
SW2 AW 4 8,004,543.60    
SW3 BG 2 4,596,021.07    
SW4 BS 4 12,500.00          
Total 12 13,421,851.32    
Selection 2: Results
Installation Offeror CPL Cost
SW1 AU 2 808,786.65        
SW2 AW 4 8,004,543.60    
SW3 BG 2 4,596,021.07    
SW4 BS 4 12,500.00          
Total 12 13,421,851.32    
 
The PO model results for Regions FE, HA, and SW using Model Scenario 3 (Apte 
et al., 2009) are shown in Table 19.  Model Scenario 3 adds a weight of 1,000,000 to CPL 
in order to place emphasis on offeror performance level. 
 




Region SW 12 13,421,851$   
 
TCPL for Regions FE and SW remained unchanged from selection 1 to 2.  The 
PO model results were the same as selections 1 and 2, due to either single-bid contracts 
or to multiple-bid contracts from offerors with the same CPL.  The PO model results for 
Region HA revealed that we could achieve cost savings by reducing the number of 
offerors that would perform the same number of contracts.  Of the three contracts in 
Region HA, offeror AE bid on two of them and had the best CPL.   Therefore, the PO 
model selected offeror AE for those two contracts, thereby reducing the TCPL to 2, 
which resulted in cost savings of $307,489 when compared to selection 2.   Figure 5 
















Figure 5.   Comparison of Strategic Sourcing and Current Processes of Selection for 
Region HA 
 
As noted before, it can be observed that the PO model gave a better TCPL at a 
lesser cost than that given by Selection 2.  However, there was a considerable cost 
increase from Selection 1 due to the decrease in TCPL.  This change shows that for every 
point change in TCPL the overall cost increased by almost $500,000.  This is important 
for contract managers to realize as there is a significant trade-off between best value and 
best price. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we conducted a comparison of the PO model results to both the 
lowest cost and best CPL selection processes.  In addition, we conducted a comparison of 
strategic sourcing selection methods using the PO model to NAVFAC’s current processes 
of selection.  In the next chapter, we provide a summary of our research, conclusions, 




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a summary of our research, conclusions and 
recommendations based on our results, and suggested areas of further research. 
 In the first chapter, we presented our research objectives and described the 
contents of the thesis that followed.  Included were the background, purpose, and 
objectives of our research.  We also described the expected benefits of our research and 
provided a detailed description of the scope and organization of the research as well as 
the methodology used to conduct the study.  In the next chapter, we conducted an in-
depth literature review of the origin of strategic sourcing.  By describing how strategic 
sourcing applies to the acquisition of services in the Department of Defense and 
specifically to the Navy, we provided an extensive background for the reader. 
Additionally, since the research was conducted using data that was provided by 
NAVFAC, we provided a summary of its organizational structure and how it operates in 
its respective regions.  Building on the model developed by Apte, Rendon, and Salmerón, 
we described the pricing optimization model and how it applies to service-based strategic 
sourcing.  And, finally, we conducted a comparison of the pricing optimization model 
results to both the lowest cost and best CPL selection processes and a comparison of 
strategic sourcing selection methods using the pricing optimization model to NAVFAC’s 
current processes of selection.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This project attempted to prove that by applying a pricing optimization model as 
the one applied to an Air Force scenario, the Navy could realize the same or similar cost 
savings.  Although, we were provided with sufficient data from NAVFAC Headquarters, 
our pricing optimization model was unable to achieve similar savings by using the 
assigned parameters in all NAVFAC regions because of sparse data resulting from the 
limited scope of NAVFAC’s current policy.  Nonetheless, we were able achieve savings 
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in Region HA because of the difference in past performance rating of the offerors and 
because those offerors submitted proposals on multiple installations. 
1. Primary Research Objective 
Identify whether the NAVFAC is currently using strategic sourcing practices 
for BOSS contracts. 
NAVFAC is not currently using strategic sourcing practices for their BOSS 
contracts.  By using a past performance rating system that does not effectively 
differentiate between offerors they are not able to use our pricing optimization model.  
Furthermore, NAVFAC is not writing solicitations in a manner that allows offerors to 
submit proposals on more than one installation for the same or similar services.  By doing 
this, it effectively eliminates any opportunity to achieve cost savings using this pricing 
optimization model.  Nonetheless, they do have an opportunity to realize the potential 
cost savings that strategic sourcing has to offer if these two counter-forces are remedied.   
2. Subsidiary Research Objectives 
(1) Analyze current data to determine if these strategic sourcing methods are 
both efficient and effective. 
NAVFAC’s current strategic sourcing methods are currently ineffective.    In the 
case of Region FE, 20 out of 22 offerors were assigned the same performance rating of 4.   
Therefore, the pricing optimization model would automatically default to the lowest-
priced offeror, if they were to all submit proposals on multiple installations.  
Furthermore, even if all of the offerors submitted proposals on multiple installations, cost 
savings that could have been achieved by NAVFAC through the use of this pricing 
optimization model would not have been realized due to similar past performance data.  
Our recommendation is to either put more emphasis on the numbers assigned for an 




(2) Attempt to improve the current methods, if any, by applying actual data to a 
proven decision model 
Based on the current selection process used by NAVFAC, no further savings can 
be achieved.  The data shows that the majority of NAVFAC’s offerors are selected based 
upon a lowest-price, technically acceptable approach.  In addition, because there is not 
disparity between offerors past performance information, the pricing optimization model 
automatically breaks the tie by selecting the offeror that is the lowest price technically 
acceptable.   
(3)  Provide recommendations to senior Navy acquisition leaders. 
NAVFAC should provide offerors with the ability to submit multiple proposals on 
different combinations of BOSS contracts within the same region.  For instance, in 
Region HA only three offerors submitted proposals on multiple bases, HA1 and HA3.  
These same contractors, using a multiple-proposal option, could have submitted 
proposals in various combinations of the bases included in Table 7.  In the previous 
section, we showed that contractor AE, who submitted proposals on multiple locations, 
was the optimal offeror when competing for BOSS contracts on multiple facilities.  In 
fact, it would have provided a cost savings of approximately $300,000, with the best 
TCPL over selection 2, which emphasized best performance over cost.  The strategic 
sourcing policy results in better TCPL for lower cost.  This policy costs far more than 
Selection1 policy but such cost would eventually result in additional savings from 
reduced contract-administration costs and volume discounts. 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Future work could be done to improve NAVFAC’s strategic sourcing strategy by 
implementing a robust past performance system and by writing solicitations that will 
allow offerors to submit proposals on multiple installations.  One of the main barriers was 
the lack of differentiation in CPL among offerors within their respective regions.  
Continued research could help develop a past performance rating system that would 
allow NAVFAC to separate the offerors from each other with regard to past performance. 
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 This project applied strategic sourcing to the NAVFAC contract environment.  
Similar research could be conducted on Navy Command, Fleet Industrial Supply Center 
(COMFISC) contracts for services in various regions and to service contracts across the 
Navy.  In addition, continued research could be applied to services contracted by Army 
Contracting Command and DoD service contracts. 
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